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Abstract 
The paper analyses Latvian economic policy during the period of 2008-2014 when the 
country was simultaneously subject to three EU economic governance frameworks – the 
European Semester, the Balance-of-Payments (BoP) programme and the Maastricht 
convergence criteria (for euro adoption). Through in-depth process tracing based on public 
policy documents, interviews with senior officials in Riga and Brussels and the press, the 
paper finds that the Latvian government cherry-picked and instrumentalised EU economic 
policy targets and overachieved them. In contrast to the literature depicting the European 
Commission as a neoliberal actor which systematically undermines social protection, the 
paper shows that against the backdrop of fiscally austere national authorities, the Commission 
instead played the role of social policy advocate, repeatedly calling for stronger measures to 
help the poor. Shedding light on the limits of one-size-fits-all governance, the findings of the 















Since the onset of the economic crisis, European Union (EU) economic governance has 
become increasingly complex. The European Commission initiated a set of new economic 
governance tools, considerably narrowing down the discretionary powers of individual 
member states. Besides strengthening and enforcing fiscal discipline, frameworks such as the 
Fiscal Compact, the Two-Pack, the Six-Pack, and the Euro-Plus Pact controlled for 
macroeconomic imbalances in a range of policy areas, such as housing, current account 
balance, and labour competitiveness, among many others. All these initiatives were 
incorporated into the European Semester – itself a framework designed to enhance the 
effectiveness of economic governance (Bekker 2013; Laffan and Schlosser 2015). However, 
over the course of the crisis, the Commission’s management of the crisis in general and the 
EU economic governance architecture in particular have been criticized as fundamentally 
neoliberal, operating to undermine the welfare state (cf. Joerges 2014).  
 
Some critics are concerned that European social security systems have become a mere 
adjustment variable for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Degryse et al. 2013; Pochet 
and Degryse 2012; Scharpf 2014: 143), and/or that the crisis might even lead to the end of the 
European Social Model (Hacker 2012). Others have argued that ‘governing by the rules and 
ruling by the numbers’, the ‘new EU economic governance’ framework exacerbated the 
social problems created by the crisis, as budget deficit reductions with pressure for structural 
reforms came at the expense of labour protection (Crespy and Menz 2015: 10; Schmidt 2014, 
2015). Finally, the Commission has been heavily criticized for its management of the 
Balance-of-Payments and Economic Adjustment programmes. The overwhelming focus on 
austerity as a means to regain economic growth, and – as a consequence – the neglect of 
social policy, has even been lambasted by its in-house auditors and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (European Court of Auditors 2015; Spiegel et al. 2015). According to 
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Lütz and Kranke (2010), the conditionality imposed on Hungary, Latvia and Romania 
amounted to a ‘European rescue of the Washington Consensus’ (Lütz and Kranke 2014). 
Specifically focusing on crisis resolution in the Baltic countries, Woolfson and Sommers 
(2016) argue that the undeviating commitment to strictly neoliberal disciplinarian terms by 
the current European Commission and the international financial community has been an 
ultimate social and economic failure (Woolfson and Sommers 2016: 90).  
 
Analysing Latvia’s economic governance simultaneously under the Balance-of-Payments 
programme, euro convergence and the European Semester, the paper aims to provide a more 
balanced view of the Commission’s stance on social policy. Drawing on interviews with 
senior officials in the Latvian government and Commission, public policy documents and the 
press, I find that against the backdrop of national authorities pursuing radical market-oriented 
policies, the Commission played the role of social policy advocate. In fact, the Latvian 
government cherry-picked and instrumentalised EU fiscal rules, overachieving them well 
beyond the targets set by the Commission. Avoiding any additional spending even when 
allowed by the Fiscal Compact and the Balance-of-Payments (BoP) programme, the 
authorities instead focused on early payment of the bailout loans. Similarly, in order to 
increase the chances of meeting the Maastricht inflation criterion, the government cut Value 
Added Tax (VAT), thus postponing a long-pending social reform.   
 
While endorsing the excessive fiscal consolidation pursued by the national authorities, as it 
helped to securitize against uncertainty, the Commission also consistently expressed social 
concerns. Together with the World Bank and the IMF, the Commission repeatedly called for 
stronger measures to help the poor and vulnerable. Moreover, besides showing how the 
Commission advocated for additional targeted measures, the paper shows several instances 
where the Commission economists called for more social spending in absolute terms. First, 
the Commission opposed the government decision to cut VAT (to curb inflation), as this 
eliminated the fiscal space to help lower income earners. Second, the Commission 
economists stated that they were ready to accept more social spending from any windfall 





Finally, the paper shows how the Commission together with the World Bank and the IMF 
triggered a progressive change in Latvia’s social policy. When the national authorities wanted 
to phase out the state co-financing of Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI) benefits on the 
assumption that due to dependence on welfare benefits people were unwilling to work, the 
lenders – the largest of whom was the Commission – demanded evidence and forced the 
government to commission a study by the World Bank. The subsequent report significantly 
challenged the common wisdom on social policy among the Latvian elites, and served as a 
basis for policy change. A key contribution to the literature is thus that the Commission’s 
persistent stance on Latvian social policy clearly goes beyond the sort of neoliberalism which 
is commonly assumed by many accounts of EU socio-economic governance since the crisis. 
 
The Latvian case provides us with a unique opportunity to analyse the simultaneous operation 
of three distinct EU governance frameworks. First, facing a default in 2008, Latvia became 
subject to the Balance-of-Payments (BoP) programme. Subsequently, from January 2012 to 
January 2015, Latvia entered the post-programme surveillance phase, still subject to 
Commission scrutiny in order to ‘closely monitor risks that could jeopardize macro-economic 
stability and hence affect the repayment capacity’ (European Commission 2012c). Second, by 
2011, as the BoP programme expired, the European Semester and Country-Specific 
Recommendations (CSRs) started to apply to Latvia.1 Finally, not wanting to renounce its 
commitment to join the euro area in 2014, Latvia sought to comply with the Maastricht 
convergence requirements on inflation, budgetary deficit, long-term interest rates and public 
debt.  
 
Analysis of the Latvian case contributes to several important debates on EU post-crisis 
governance. First, it shows that the Latvian government was able to cherry-pick policy targets 
from various governance frameworks, justifying non-compliance in some areas with over-
compliance in others. Second, in contrast to the literature that calls for a more enforceable 
social dimension at the EU level (e.g. Schoukens 2013; Vandenbroucke et al. 2013), the 
                                                                
1 The European Semester is an annual cycle of economic policy coordination, according to which each year the Commission 
undertakes a detailed analysis of the member states’ programmes of economic and structural reforms. It starts by the 
Commission, the Council and the European Council issuing the Annual Growth Survey. After reviewing the Commission’s 
Country Reports and National Reform Programmes, the Commission and Council issue Country-Specific Recommendations 
(CSRs) (European Commission 2015b).  
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evidence from the Latvian case does not support the view that more hierarchical governance 
would necessarily lead to better results. In fact, the Latvian authorities exercised considerable 
discretion not only in ‘soft’ policy areas, such as social assistance, but also in ‘hard’ fiscal 
policy areas such as taxation, budgeting and spending as well. Moreover, the Latvian case 
shows that hierarchically imposed ready-made rules not only fail to address adequately local 
needs and challenges, but can also be strategically misused by the governing élites.  
  
The paper is organized as follows. First, I briefly review evaluations of EU economic 
governance since the crisis and introduce the analytical framework. Then, after reviewing the 
background to the economic crisis, I explore the Latvian fiscal and social policy making 
process, as the country was converging to the euro. I conclude by briefly drawing out the 
broader implications of the Latvian case for EU economic governance more generally.  
 
EU economic governance and ‘uses of Europe’  
A central criticism of the enforced economic governance architecture has concerned the 
imbalance between fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance, on the one hand, and broader 
social policy, on the other (de la Porte and Heins 2014). While the macro-economic 
governance tools are based on pre-set numerical indicators and sanctions in the case of non-
compliance, social policy continues by and large with the soft governance approach 
established by the Open Method of Coordination (Vandenbroucke et al. 2013: 5). However, 
the conceptual line between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ governance may not be so sharp in practice. As 
argued by Trubek and Trubek (2005), with increased emphasis on experimentation, 
deliberation and discursive diffusion, ‘soft’ law may be ‘harder’ than it seems at first glance. 
In addition, due to implementation problems, ‘hard’ law on the books does not necessarily 
correspond to law in action (Trubek and Trubek 2005: 361). Thus, Bekker (2013) finds that 
since the crisis, the ‘hardness’ from the fiscal policy domain has to some extent spilled-over 
to the social policy domain – for instance, employment and social policy are increasingly 
evaluated from an economic or financial perspective (Bekker 2013: 9). The opposite dynamic 
is also visible. According to Vivien Schmidt (2014), rather than lending ‘hardness’ to the 
social domain, economic and fiscal governance itself has become more flexible and 
interpretation-based – if not admitted openly, than ‘by stealth’. For instance, within the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure, public deficits were increasingly considered on a ‘structural’, 
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rather than ‘cyclical’ basis, thus allowing for more fiscal space (Schmidt 2014: 8–10). 
However, beyond these enforcement dynamics, there is no doubt that in substantive terms EU 
economic governance has become increasingly socially balanced since the beginning of the 
crisis. If the 2011 Annual Growth Survey (AGS) prioritized rigorous fiscal consolidation, 
labour market reforms and growth enhancing measures, its successors provided a broader and 
more socially balanced set of priorities, which was further reflected in the European Semester 
(European Commission 2011, 2012a). The subsequent rounds of Country-Specific 
Recommendations (CSRs) proposed a variety of reforms in social security, pension, 
education and healthcare systems. Together with the intensification of social monitoring, 
multilateral surveillance and an enhanced role for social and employment policy actors, this 
has resulted in the ‘progressive socialization’ of the European Semester (Vanhercke et al. 
2015; Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2014). 
 
The paper shows how the national authorities in Latvia cherry-picked and instrumentalised 
various EU rules and recommendations, by using them as external constraint(s). A classic 
example of governing by external constraint or what Dyson and Featherstone (1996) call a 
vincolo esterno is Italy in the 1990s. In order to overcome the problem of obstructive party 
dominance, the Italian technocratic élite shared a belief in the need for externally imposed 
economic discipline, and found it in the euro conditionality (Dyson and Featherstone 1996). 
The EU anchor served a double function for Italy. First, it offered incentives for the 
reorientation of economic, social and political attitudes from below (related to the four 
freedoms of labour, goods, capital, and services). Second, it gave the élite precious resources 
from above to legitimize difficult policy measures. The combination of carrots (accession to 
EMU) and sticks (higher interest rates and currency depreciations whenever the markets 
expected Italy to devalue) led to significant upgrades in the organization of Italy’s labour 
market, as well as in the fiscal and social policy domains (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). I 
show that the Latvian authorities used similar ‘hand-tying’ strategies to pursue their preferred 
policies.  
  
In order to establish the causal mechanisms involved, I trace the policy making process on the 
basis of three broad data sources (George and Bennett 2005). First, I conducted élite 
interviews with four economists at the Commission’s Directorate-Generals for Economic and 
Financial Affairs (ECFIN), Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (EMPL), 
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three senior officials at the Latvian Ministries of Economics, Finance and Welfare, as well as 
Ilze Viņķele, former Minister of Welfare (2011-2014). Second, I draw extensively on official 
documents from different policy coordination frameworks. For instance, within the European 
Semester, I analyse Country-Specific Recommendations, National Reform Plans, and 
Commission staff working documents. I also examine euro convergence reports 
(programmes), as well as the Balance of Payments programme reviews. Finally, I rely on the 
relevant press sources to follow the public debates.  
 
Economic crisis in Latvia 
On May 1, 2004 Latvia joined the EU, soon after pegging its currency to the euro. Investors’ 
optimism abounded and the country was flooded with foreign capital. In the following years 
Latvia experienced double-digit real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and inflation rates. 
Nominal wages doubled and property prices increased fourfold (European Commission 
2012b: 3). However, in 2008, following the freeze of liquidity in the international markets 
and the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the overheated Latvian economy fell into recession. 
Needing to nationalize Parex, Latvia’s second largest bank with the biggest domestic market 
share in the EU, the authorities turned to the IMF and the Commission for a bailout (Aslund 
and Dombrovskis 2011: 33–34). Rejecting advice from various internationally renowned 
economists and the IMF to devalue the currency (Krugman 2009; Lütz and Kranke 2014: 
320; Roubini 2008), the government orchestrated a massive ‘internal devaluation’. Framing 
austerity as ‘virtuous pain after the immoral party’ (Blyth 2013: 13), a new ethos was 
constructed: to avoid spending at any cost. A broad range of structural reforms were 
implemented. Among other things, the government closed half of the 75 government agencies 
and cut public salaries by 26 per cent (Aslund and Dombrovskis 2011: 72–73). Although, 
Latvian crisis management became a ‘success story’ in macroeconomic terms, the social 
costs were immense (Aslund 2013; Austers 2014; Lagarde 2012). In the first two years of the 
recession, the Latvian economy shrank by approximately a quarter. In 2010, unemployment 
rose to 20.7 per cent.  
 
In order to push through the reforms, the Latvian authorities heavily relied on ‘external 
constraints’. In his co-authored book How Latvia came through the crisis, Prime Minister 
(PM) Dombrovskis himself admits that the structural reforms were based on ‘an international 
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norm that made sense’. As regards the use of vincolo esterno, Dombrovskis is explicit: 
‘Luckily, the government did not have to invent these reforms hastily. They were well 
prepared and documented, primarily through studies the government had done with the 
World Bank. The government basically had to take these reform proposals off the shelf and 
start implementing them, and it did’ (Aslund and Dombrovskis 2011: 72–73). Relatedly, as I 
show below, the bailout conditionality and the Fiscal Compact were welcomed by the Latvian 
government as tools for more rapid budget consolidation.   
 
However, the economic recession had limited electoral effects on the distribution of political 
power. Despite the hardship imposed on the Latvian society, PM Dombrovskis was re-elected 
in 2010 and 2011. To a large extent this can be explained by the well-established ‘ethnic 
cleavage with a corruption divide’ (Auers 2013: 94). In brief, ethnic Latvians vote for mostly 
the centre-right Latvian parties depending on their stance of fighting corruption, while ethnic 
Russians vote for the centre-left Russian parties – which have so far been kept out of 
government. Latvia’s politics during the recession closely follows these lines. Replacing the 
allegedly corrupt and profligate previous government, PM Dombrovskis formed a centre-
right cabinet with a two-fold agenda of fiscal consolidation and euro accession. To the extent 
that the consolidation measures were mostly contested by the Russian (not Latvian) 
opposition, the Latvian ruling coalition, and more specifically PM Dombrovskis and Finance 
Minister Vilks, were relatively free to pursue it. The same applies to euro accession. Aiming 
to further integrate in the EU and obtain security against the perceived threat of Russia, the 
Latvian authorities did not abandon the ambition to adopt the euro throughout the crisis 
(Dandashly and Verdun 2015: 5; Milne 2013). In economic terms, the authorities emphasized 
the significance of financial stability and market confidence which would likely lead to lower 
borrowing costs, increased investment and economic growth (Traynor 2012). Politically, euro 
accession was bundled together with Latvia’s ‘success story’ of internal devaluation, where 
one continued the other.  
 
Governance in fiscal policy  
Latvia’s fiscal policy during the crisis consisted in a chain of overachievements. The 
government voluntarily set more ambitious fiscal policy targets than required by the EU 
frameworks and the bailout conditionality, thus minimizing its spending options. Reviewing 
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three major instances of self-imposed austerity, I show that the Latvian government pursued a 
more austere approach to fiscal consolidation than the lenders. First, the government 
repeatedly used the positive growth dynamics in its trade partners’ economies to revise the 
budget targets; second, the government instrumentalised the most stringent version of the 
Fiscal Compact to maximize fiscal discipline; and third, the government did not take the 
advantage of windfall revenue as would have been permitted by the Balance-of-Payments 
programme.  
 
In late 2010, the government projected a 2011 budget deficit at 5.4% of GDP – a 
considerably lower target than the previously planned 6%. By April 2011, adopting additional 
fiscal consolidation measures, the government reduced the deficit even further to 4.5% of 
GDP. The budget deficit target for 2012 was then set at 2.5% of GDP, thus overachieving the 
3% threshold, required by the Excessive Deficit Procedure (Ministry of Economics 2011: 10). 
By early 2012, the budget deficit target for 2012 was further reduced to 2.1% of GDP 
(Ministry of Economics 2012: 24). To a considerable degree overachieving the fiscal targets 
was enabled by ‘better-than-expected economic growth’, as Latvia took the advantage of the 
positive economic conditions in its main trading partners’ economies and the slower 
development of some planned investment projects. To put it in the words of an ECFIN 
economist: ‘to some extent, Latvia was just lucky’ (Interviews 2013a, 2013f).  
 
The setting of excessive budget targets served several purposes. First, it provided a safety 
margin against the unpredictability of Latvia’s political process. According to a national 
official, tying politicians’ hands simply made the budget drafting process much easier: 
‘Nobody really knows how one or another political power would behave before or after the 
budget adoption. Therefore, everything is planned with a certain reserve margin.’ (Interview 
2013g). That the excessive fiscal stringency also helped the government’s commitment to 
comply with the Maastricht deficit criterion for joining the euro was confirmed by both the 
officials at the Commission and the government: ‘All these plans on the euro made it possible 
to put the ruling powers in a kind of frame because there are always desires and needs...’ 




For the same ‘hand-tying’ reasons, the national authorities warmly welcomed the introduction 
of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (the Fiscal Compact), and 
voluntarily overachieved its targets. In fact, Finance Minister Vilks argued for the need to 
secure fiscal discipline in the Constitution already in 2010 – before the adoption of the Fiscal 
Compact in 2012 and the Fiscal Discipline Law in 2013.2 Commenting on the Latvian 
Constitutional Court decision (2009) to repeal the planned pension cuts as they violated the 
pensioners’ right for social security, Vilks was concerned that the Constitutional Court 
‘limited the scope of austerity’ (tvnet.lv 2010).  
 
As the Fiscal Compact stipulates, a country’s Medium-Term Objective (MTO) budgetary 
deficit can be -1% of GDP, provided that its public debt is significantly below 60% of GDP. 
With 46.0% of GDP in 2011 and 40.7% of GDP in 2012 Latvia complied with this provision; 
however, the authorities chose to set the MTO at -0.5% of GDP. Exercising a completely free 
choice in the matter, the Latvian government simply wanted to be ‘more ambitious’ 
(Interviews 2013a, 2013b, 2013f). Its rationale was to maximize the discipline imposed by an 
external constraint to save the authorities from any ‘unnecessary’ disputes and arguments, 
particularly from the opposition. According to a high-ranking official at the Ministry of 
Welfare: ‘Before the Fiscal Discipline Law nobody really knew what the actual fiscal space 
was. Budgeting was a total chaos. Now you simply look at the number. Certainty is the most 
important thing’ (Interview 2013g). According to a high-ranking Finance Ministry official, 
the Fiscal Compact guaranteed that ‘the state would not return to ‘fiscal blackguardism’ 
anymore’ (Interview 2013f).  
 
However, the Latvian government did not use all the fiscal spending options allowed by the 
EU frameworks and the bailout conditionality. As stipulated by the 2010 Memorandum of 
Understanding, after the regular payback of the bailout loan, all ‘unexpected’ windfall 
revenue should have been used for three purposes: first, to achieve a lower-than-targeted 
budget deficit; second, to accelerate EU funds expenditure, and third, to increase funding for 
active labour market policies and social safety net measures (Supplemental Memorandum of 
Understanding 2009, 2010: 6). Nonetheless, rather than taking the opportunity for additional 
spending, the government chose to concentrate on early payback of the bailout loans.  
                                                                




Regarding the excessive austerity measures, the Commission’s position seems ambivalent. 
On the one hand, it endorsed the excessive fiscal policy targets pursued by the national 
authorities, as this helped to securitize against uncertainty (Interview 2013c). On the other 
hand, the Commission worried about the social costs of the consolidation measures: ‘We 
have been emphasizing that more resources have to be allocated for social needs, and training 
for the unemployed... However, the government did not listen to us. Rather, they were 
looking forward to getting better budget numbers’ (Interview 2013b).  
 
It has to be noted that while overachieving the targets in some fiscal areas, the government 
breached them in others. Special attention should be given to the fact that these derogations 
occurred while Latvia was subject to post-programme surveillance. In mid-2012, inspired by 
Latvia’s unexpected economic growth – at the time the highest in the EU – the authorities 
reopened the state budget. Additional spending amounting to 0.5% of GDP was allocated to a 
range of sectors, including healthcare, transport infrastructure, agriculture, demography and 
culture. According to PM Dombrovskis, this was the first time in five years when the 
government allowed itself to spend on priorities other than fiscal consolidation. However, in 
order to maintain fiscal discipline, the additional spending covered only a fraction of the 
wind-fall revenue (European Commission 2013c; Likumi.lv 2012). The government also set a 
three-year strategy to cut the flat personal income tax rate from 25% to 20%. As these 
measures ran counter to both the National Reform Programme and the Country-Specific 
Recommendations (European Commission 2012c: 4; Ministry of Economics 2012: 28), they 
were strongly disapproved by the Commission (European Commission 2013c: 2). 
 
Finally, taking advantage of the ‘structural reform clause’, which provided flexibility within 
the EU fiscal rules (European Commission 2015c: 10), Latvia exercised significant discretion 
in managing its pension system. In 2009, responding to the rapidly decreasing levels of social 
security contributions in the first pension pillar, the government had reduced the contribution 
rate to the second pillar from 8% to 2% (Volskis 2012: 9). Initially, it was planned that from 
2013 contributions at a rate of 6% to the second pillar would be restored (Ministry of 
Economics 2012: 13). However, in order to accumulate additional assets in the social budget 
the government restored the contributions at only a 4% rate. Although, the Commission noted 
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that the policy ran ‘contrary to previous commitments by the authorities under the (BoP) 
program as well as more recent Country-Specific Recommendations’, eventually, it not only 
accepted this move, but also allowed Latvia to derogate from the pre-set MTO of budget 
deficit of 0.5% of GDP for the amount needed to continue the pension reform (European 
Commission 2013c: 9; Interview 2013b). The above provides another example showing how 
the Commission compromised fiscal targets for the sake of a socially significant reform.   
 
 
Convergence towards the euro 
In order to the join the euro area, Latvia had to comply with the Maastricht convergence 
criteria with regard to the budget deficit, government debt, long-term interest rate and 
inflation.3 Since the other targets had already been covered by the consolidation programme, 
the main challenge was inflation – especially due to its dependence on a variety of factors 
beyond the control of the government. Lithuania’s failure to qualify for the euro in 2006, by 
missing the inflation target by just 0.1%, served as an effective reminder. Committed to 
avoiding a similar scenario by any means possible, the Latvian government started to plan a 
range of measures already in 2010. According to the Finance Minister, the control of inflation 
was a strategic priority, and compared to the other convergence targets – the most elusive 
one: ‘The sooner we can push inflation down to a certain level, the better for all. Unless there 
is a strong tripartite collaboration and agreement between the government, employers, and 
employees, Latvia will not succeed in decreasing inflation to the level needed to introduce the 
euro’ (Vilks 2010, 2011).  
 
Most notably, inflation curbing involved ad hoc manipulations of the VAT rate. In 2010, 
aiming to increase the budget revenue, the government considered increasing VAT by one 
percentage point. Finance Minister Vilks proposed that VAT should be raised already in 
2011, as raising it in 2012 could endanger compliance with the inflation target (Vilks 2010). 
Accordingly, from January 2011, the standard VAT rate was raised from 21% to 22%, while 
                                                                
3 The inflation rate may not be more than 1.5 percentage points above the rate of the three best performing member states. 
Government budget deficit as a percentage of GDP may not exceed 3%, while government debt as a percentage may not 
exceed 60% of GDP. The long-term interest rate on government bonds may not be 2 percentage points above the rate of the 
three best performing MS. Finally, a member state has to participate in the ERMII mechanism for at least 2 years without 
severe tensions (European Commission 2015d). 
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the lower VAT rate was raised from 10% to 12%. In mid-2012, as predicted, the risk of 
missing the inflation target substantially increased, as Latvia had become one of the most 
rapidly growing economies in the EU. The government intervened again, cutting the VAT 
rate from 22% to 21%. That the tax cut was euro-motivated was later confirmed by staff at 
the Commission and the Ministry of Economics (Interviews 2013b, 2013e). Eventually, 
Latvia met the inflation target with a 1.4% reserve; thus the estimated 0.5 percentage point 
effect of the VAT cut was not decisive for Latvia’s qualification for the euro (European 
Commission 2013b: 30). However, as observed by two ECFIN economists, if the inflation 
benchmark had only been met with the help of the VAT cut, Latvia’s euro application could 
have been rejected (Interviews 2013a, 2013c). Meanwhile, the Commission was concerned 
that the VAT cut limited opportunities to raise non-taxable thresholds and thus help low 
earners: ‘There are too many low wages, and the tax wedge on labour is the highest for 
people with the lowest income. That was a good opportunity to help them a bit already then’ 
(Interview 2013b).  
 
Governance of social policy: before and after accession to the euro 
Throughout the budget consolidation process, social policy was subordinated to the early 
payment of the bailout loans and accession to the euro. The authorities constantly ignored the 
Commission’s social recommendations. Responding to lenders’ criticisms, Latvia sought in 
its 2011 National Reform Programme to reduce the personal income tax burden on the 
economically active population and the population at risk of poverty, to raise the personal 
income allowance for dependants, to introduce a differentiated personal income tax, to 
provide social protection for families with children, and to encourage participation in the 
labour market (Ministry of Economics 2011). However, little of this was achieved in practice 
within the relevant time frame (European Commission 2012c; Interviews 2013a, 2013b).  
 
The few successful social measures valued by the Commission included active labour market 
policies and training for the unemployed, initiatives to reverse the declining demographic 
trends (relaxing caps on maternity/paternity allowances, increasing minimum paternal 
benefits, child care benefits and PIT allowance for dependants), as well as the temporary 
public job programme Workplaces with Stipends, financed by the European Social Fund. 
Although, the programme was successful in helping the unemployed to mitigate the impact of 
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the crisis (World Bank 2013a: 10), the Commission was concerned that it was used as a 
substitute for social assistance and did not address the main barriers to employment 
(European Commission 2013a: 17). Overall, Latvia’s progress in social policy reforms 
remained unsatisfactory (European Commission 2013a: 4). 
 
The picture changed after the government paid the lenders – and was admitted into the Euro-
Area (mid-2013). As the first Latvian budget drafted in the euro currency, the 2014 budget 
was also ‘historic’ in the sense that it prioritized reducing inequality and poverty, as well as 
improving the demographic situation (The Baltic Course 2013). Various social goals 
remained high on the political agenda over the coming years (Latvia.eu 2015; The Baltic 
Course 2014a, 2014b). Subsequently, several long-pending social policy reforms were 
adopted. The government introduced and extended a range of support measures for families 
with children, including maternity and paternity allowances, minimum monthly paternal and 
child care benefits and a Personal Income Tax (PIT) allowance for dependants. Partial 
indexation of pensions resumed and disability benefits were increased. The minimum wage 
was raised from EUR 320 to EUR 360 in 2015 and EUR 370 in 2016.  
 
Notably, the social policy turn was not due to changes in the government. In fact, Unity 
(Vienotība) remained the main ruling party throughout the crisis. Even when PM 
Dombrovskis resigned after the Zolitūde shopping centre collapse in early 2013, the next 
Prime Minister Laimdota Straujuma (also from the Unity party) kept largely the same cabinet 
both before and after the 2014 elections (Ikstens 2015: 185).  
 
At a general level, the social policy turn was a response to the far-and-wide reaching 
hardships imposed by the recession (Interviews 2013d, 2013g). Looking more closely, 
however, evidence suggests that the critical juncture was the negotiation process on GMI 
benefits and housing allowances between the lenders and the government. At the onset of the 
recession, following recommendations by the Commission and the World Bank, the GMI 
payment was taken over from the local municipalities by the government and the amount was 
substantially increased from LVL 27 to 45 (EUR 64) for children and to LVL 40 (EUR 57) 
for adults. However, as the economy improved, the government wanted to return to the 
previous arrangement. As admitted by Ilze Viņķele, then Minister of Welfare, in a personal 
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interview, all the lenders were strictly against phasing-out of the state financing and the 
decrease in the benefit amount. In turn, the municipalities, that would now have to take over 
the payments, ardently protested that the GMI benefit had to be eliminated altogether. 
According to the city mayors, people were ‘becoming recipients of benefits over generations’ 
and therefore did not want to work. As recalled by Minister Viņķele: ‘Since we lacked any 
credible data as to what was actually going on with the GMI benefit recipients, I came up 
with an offer that if our current proposal was accepted, the government would study the GMI 
recipients, and then on the basis of the findings, would change the benefit system.’ However, 
the lenders responded with a unanimous ‘ultimatum’ that the research had to be done by the 
World Bank, since the government allegedly lacked the skills, experience, and methodology 
to make such a study credible (Interview 2016).  
 
In the meantime, despite the lenders’ fierce objections, the government proceeded on its own. 
As from 2013, the authorities decreased the GMI to LVL 35 for all recipients and returned its 
administration back to the municipalities. As a ‘significant reversal of gains achieved during 
and following the crisis’ this policy was criticized by the World Bank (World Bank 2013a: 8; 
World Bank 2013b), the IMF and the Commission. The latter was concerned that the decision 
would ‘maintain an uneven system with negative impact on benefit coverage and 
adequacy’(European Commission 2013c: 10; IMF 2013: 48).  
 
The subsequent World Bank report Who is Unemployed, Inactive or Needy?, partially 
financed by the European Social Fund, plainly refuted the common wisdom in Latvian 
government and business circles that there was a large-scale dependence on social welfare 
benefits, which, in turn, made the poor unwilling to work (World Bank 2013c). As publicly 
admitted by Minister Viņķele, the study challenged the government’s view on welfare, 
shifting it away from ‘stereotypes, emotional opinions and ‘even phobias’ (Tapiņš 2013). 
Shortly after its publication, the Ministry of Welfare announced plans to increase the non-
taxable income threshold, tax credits for dependents and the disabled, as well as the minimum 
wage (Dārziņa 2013). The Latvian government continued this progressive policy course even 
after the end of the Commission’s close monitoring in 2014 – notably, in taxation. While the 
wave of tax credits and allowances for the poor and unprotected represented progressive 
16 
 
taxation ‘by stealth’, the measures adopted from 2016 did so more openly (The Baltic Course 
2015; Vanags and Zasova 2015).  
 
Conclusion 
This case study of Latvia’s economic governance, first, gives in-depth insight into how EU 
rules may be cherry-picked and instrumentalised by national authorities. The Latvian 
government took advantage of all three governance frameworks to which it was subject – the 
Balance-of-Payments programme, the Maastricht convergence criteria and the European 
Semester, according to its priorities at the time. Initially, the government mainly focused on 
fiscal consolidation and the early payback of the loans. In order to do this, the Balance-of-
Payments programme and the Fiscal Compact were instrumentalised, by pushing fiscal 
targets to the extreme. However, once the authorities had accomplished the early loan 
repayment to the IMF and paid 75% of the loan back to the Commission (thus entering the 
post-programme surveillance phase with a significantly reduced level of monitoring), the 
government shifted its reform focus to euro convergence. In order to push down inflation and 
comply with the Maastricht price stability criterion, the government cut VAT. Meanwhile, 
against a backdrop of self-imposed austerity, the authorities constantly ignored the 
Commission’s advocacy to take care of the poor and vulnerable groups.  
 
Nonetheless, in 2013, as Latvia received the green light to join the Euro Area, the 
Commission’s social policy recommendations finally started to gain traction – without major 
changes in government. During the subsequent years, Latvia adopted a range of progressive 
reforms targeted at reducing poverty and inequality. As the paper shows, to a considerable 
extent this progress in Latvia’s social policy was a result of the advocacy by the international 
lenders – notably, the Commission, the World Bank and the IMF. In response to the 
government’s plans to phase out the state financing of social benefits, the international 
lenders – of whom the Commission was by far the largest – unanimously forced the 
government to commission a study by the World Bank. The subsequent report effectively 
refuted the common wisdom on welfare provision among the Latvian elites, and served as a 




However, ‘harder’ social policy governance does not always lead to more compliance. In 
fact, the government continued the progressive policy reforms even after 2014 when close 
monitoring ended. In addition, the authorities exercised substantial discretion in ‘soft’ social 
policy, as well as in ‘hard’ fiscal policy areas, such as budgeting, pensions, taxation and 
spending – even when subject to the Balance-of-Payments programme and post-programme 
surveillance. Yet to the extent that the formal overachievements in some policy areas were 
used implicitly as a justification for the derogations in others, the limited effectiveness of 
social policy governance might be a consequence of the one-size-fits-all operation of the 
fiscal and euro-related governance frameworks, as these were pushed to the extreme by the 
national authorities.  
 
This case study has significant implications for EU economic governance as a whole. As the 
evidence shows, hierarchical governance structures not only suffer from an inability to 
address local needs and challenges, but also from ineffectiveness in operation. When 
designing one-size-fits-all fiscal rules or the convergence criteria, EU policy makers could 
not have anticipated either the socio-economic conditions of the specific member state, or the 
preferences of its governing élites. Additional uncertainty came about as a result of 
opportunistic cherry-picking and instrumentalisation of the frameworks on the part of the 
government. Meanwhile, the Commission’s advocacy of social policy in Latvia serves as a 
positive example of how its governance approach can be dynamically adjusted according to 
experience on the ground. Responding to the fiscal radicalism pursued by the authorities, the 
Commission became a social policy advocate even before the broader social agenda of the 
European Semester was first formalized in the 2012 Annual Growth Survey (European 
Commission 2012a). Latvia’s social policy still significantly falls short of the European 
Semester benchmarks. The Commission has concluded that little progress had been made on 
a number of big-ticket ‘quality-of-life improving’ reforms to tackle high social inequality and 
poverty (European Commission 2014; European Commission 2015a). Nonetheless, social 
policy in Latvia has become increasingly progressive since the economic crisis – to a large 
extent, because of Commission’s pressure. The Latvian experience may send a positive signal 
to other countries in the EU’s periphery, struggling with malfunctioning social policy 
systems, whether in terms of poor targeting or low spending – such as the other neoliberal 
Baltic countries and the weak states in South-Eastern Europe (i.e. Romania, Bulgaria and 
Croatia) (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). As the Latvian case shows, if electoral support for 
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economic redistribution is low, pressure from external institutions can play an important role 
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